Studies have shown that despite infrequent inspections and low penalties for statutory violations, a large fraction of firms comply with environmental restrictions. What then motivates compliance? I investigate this question by focusing on the length of time it takes environmental agencies to process and issue new source construction permits pursuant to Clean Air Act regulations and new industrial discharge permits pursuant to Clean Water Act regulations. I find that plants (or firms) with fewer instances of noncompliance receive permits for major projects more quickly. In addition, I find that permit delays are sensitive to economic conditions as well, such as local area unemployment. As far as voluntary pollution control behavior is concerned, I find that regulators that issue permits for plant modifications focus primarily on statutory compliance, but when permitting new plant construction, where there is no plant compliance history to go on, voluntary pollutant releases do matter.
I. Introduction
The motivations for compliance with environmental law continue to puzzle researchers. Nearly all reliable data on environmental compliance indicate that inspections are far too infrequent and penalties for noncompliance too small to be considered a reasonable deterrent. For instance, Clifford Russell describes a Resources for the Future survey that found that large air pollution sources were visited by state agencies' enforcement personnel an average of once every 8 months, and large water pollution sources were visited only once every 5 months.
1 Since operating permits generally set discharge limits on a per-hour or per-day basis, such inspection activity seems rather infrequent. Moreover, the same survey revealed that penalties per discovered * I would like to thank Tom Lyon, John Maxwell, Sam Peltzman, an anonymous referee, and participants at Indiana University's Business Economics and Public Policy seminar series for their helpful comments. Any errors remaining herein are my own.
1 Clifford S. Russell, Monitoring and Enforcement, in Public Policies for Environmental Protection 243 (Paul R. Portney ed. 1990 ).
suffer a 1.2 percent loss in market value (about $33 million) when a suit is filed against a firm for violation of solid-waste-management laws. 8 Returning to regulatory behavior, there is reason to believe that other benefits to maintaining a good statutory compliance record exist. For instance, companies that wish to build new plants or modify existing plants that emit pollutants into the air or water are required to obtain special permits from the relevant state environmental protection agency. In fact, permitting is an integral part of the major environmental statutes in the United States, and most of the time enforcement actions are brought against plants for failure to meet the guidelines specifically stipulated in their permits. Since permits are largely issued on a plant-by-plant basis, regulators are in a position to utilize a plant's compliance history when determining whether a permit should be granted. Conversely then, firms may be in a position to influence the behavior of these permitting authorities.
Indeed, the transaction costs associated with permitting delays, complications, repeated information requests, and appearances before zoning boards can be quite high. James Boyd, Alan Krupnick, and Janice Mazurek assert that the costs associated with production delays can be exacerbated by longer permitting times. 9 Focusing particular attention on the high-technology, microprocessor industry, they state that "permit modification and review processes can impose delays for weeks, months, or even years. In the presence of competition, delays threaten to erode slim technological and marketing leads." 10 Moreover, "some managers posit that production delays cost Intel a million dollars in lost revenue each day."
11 Kelly Robinson makes a similar point, stating that "production delays due to extended permit preparation and review . . . can interrupt revenue streams and extend financing costs and may cause the firm to incur performance penalties or miss short-lived strategic opportunities."
12 Finally, Geoffrey Keogh and Alan Evans cite evidence that tying up land in the development process costs the U.K. building industry as much as £35.5 million (about $50-$55 million) per week. 13 Some case study evidence even suggests that a good environmental record can reduce these costs. Marie Christel Cothran cites several case studies in which corporations were able to gain building permits from local government authorities in record time, and receive variances on existing regulations more easily, by promoting environmental activities, undertaking voluntary environmental investments, and achieving high compliance rates.
14 For instance, in 1991, Vulcan Materials, Inc., sought a construction permit to open several additional quarries in Virginia. Quarries are required by Virginia state law to maintain a buffer zone-or wildlife preserve-around each quarry. The company voluntarily extended its buffer zones, created water holes, and planted shrubs and other vegetation to further support area wildlife. In response, it found faster permitting times and easier acquisition of construction permits. As Cothran writes, "Permitting boards view corporations with a history of environmental consciousness more favorably." 15 From a firm's perspective, however, whether this regulatory response is beneficial depends on the cost of developing a good environmental record versus the cost savings associated with quicker permitting. For firms building new facilities, for instance, these cost savings will depend on three factors: the number of new facilities the firm expects to build, the costs of regulatory delay, and the amount of time saved (measured here in days) from avoiding environmental noncompliance at the firm's existing plants. Specifically, if (number of new plants # cost of regulatory delay # days saved)
then the firm would opt to maintain compliance in order to avoid costly delays. The question is whether (1) holds.
Clearly, permitting plays a prominent role in environmental law and may have significant implications for environmental compliance. To my knowledge, however, no formal studies exist that investigate the environmental permitting process. I attempt to fill this void by addressing the following questions. First, does a history of good environmental stewardship hasten permit issuance?
16 Second, if so, by how much? Finally, is there reason to believe that the incentives to avoid permit delays offer a possible solution to the Harrington paradox?
My results indicate that plants (or firms) with fewer instances of noncompliance indeed receive their permits more quickly, particularly for larger projects. Turning attention to the other control variables, I also find that permits are issued more quickly to those plants that are located in counties in which the unemployment rate is relatively high and in those states that tend to be more politically conservative. As far as voluntary pollution control behavior is concerned, my results indicate that regulators that issue permits for plant modifications focus primarily on that plant's historical statutory compliance. However, when permitting for new facilities, where there is no compliance history to go on, voluntary environmental behavior also matters.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, I will highlight certain elements of environmental statutory permitting. Section III includes the basic model to be estimated and the data used in the analysis. In Section IV, I discuss the econometric methodology used in this paper, and in Section V, I present the results. In Section VI, I implement the cost-benefit analysis implied by equation (1) using some of my estimates, and in Section VII, I conclude by suggesting some useful research extensions.
II. A Brief Discussion of Environmental Permitting
In this study, I have chosen to concentrate principally on New Source Review (NSR) permits, which fall under the New Source Control Program pursuant to the Clean Air Act (CAA), and National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits, which are required under the Clean Water Act (CWA). Under these statutes, it is primarily the responsibility of the states to assess and issue these permits. 17 Moreover, states also have primary authority over the monitoring and enforcement of granted permits. In this section, I will discuss certain elements of both the NSR and NPDES permitting processes.
A. New Source Review Permitting
The 1970 and 1977 amendments to the CAA established and developed an implementation strategy for new and modified sources of air pollution called New Source Performance Standards (NSPS). States implement these standards through a program called New Source Review, under which new and modified air pollution sources are subject to preconstruction review and permitting. A project is tagged as either "major" or "minor" depending on certain characteristics such as each source's potential for harming the environment (see Table 1 for details).
Permit applications are submitted directly to the appropriate state environmental management agency and include a detailed description of the new or modified facility's design and construction schedule as well as a description of the pollution control technology to be implemented. In addition, primarily for major projects, the application must provide information on the new source's potential impact on air visibility, soils, and vegetation in the area. Note that NSR permits are issued on a project-by-project basis. Hence, when a firm wishes to expand or modify an existing plant, an NSR permit is required. Depending on the frequency of modifications, a single plant can have several different NSR permits over the course of its operating life.
Once the application is received, the state environmental agency has 30 days to request from the applicant any additional information deemed necessary to make an informed decision regarding permit issuance. There is no stated limit on the number of information requests an agency can make, and particularly for major projects, repeated information requests are often made. After the agency is satisfied with the application's information content, the agency must make a preliminary determination on permit issuance, give public notice of its decision, and provide an opportunity for comment and public hearings before the permit is issued.
B. Industrial Discharge Permits
The NPDES is the principal means through which CWA provisions are implemented. It is a permitting program that requires any source that discharges a designated CWA pollutant into the nation's lakes, rivers, and other navigable waterways to obtain a discharge permit from the relevant state environmental agency. All state permits are subject to EPA review.
Unlike the NSR permits, each NPDES permit is issued on a plant-by-plant basis and is active for 5 years. These permits cover a wide variety of plants, from publicly owned waste treatment plants to privately owned industrial plants. The focus of this study is on permits granted to industrial entities often called Industrial Discharge Permits (IDPs). Given the broad definition of "pollutants" subject to CWA regulation, the permit application itself requires an extensive amount of information about the facility, the nature of the pollution discharges, and the proposed pollution control technology to be adopted. As with NSR permits, IDP-permitted facilities are classified as either major or minor dischargers (see Table 1 ).
Once an application has been submitted, discussions with the applicant are initiated by the state agency to address detailed features of the individual permit. This can be the most time-consuming element of the permitting process since the information demands for each permit are immense. Once a permit document is completed, the agency must post a "notice of issuance" to allow for public response before a final permit can be issued.
III. The Model and Permit Data
For NSR permits and IDPs issued between 1990 and 1998, I have collected data on the proposed location of the new or existing plant, the Standard Industrial Classification, the dates when the application was received and issued, and whether the project is major or minor. To these data I have linked plant-level information on toxic chemical releases, noncompliance history, county demographic and economic information, and some state-level data, discussed in detail below.
Since state environmental agencies are responsible for permit issuance (as well as enforcement of permit restrictions), permit data are often available only by directly contacting each state's environmental protection office. I have chosen to focus my study on six midwestern states comprising the EPA's Region V: Michigan, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, Minnesota, and Wisconsin. Moreover, I have chosen to focus only on permits for industrial sources because compliance and toxic chemical release data are reliably available on a plant-by-plant basis for these sectors. The general model is
where DUR measures the time (in days) between NSR (IDP) permit application and permit approval. Table 2 provides a list of variable definitions as well as my prior expectation of each variable's expected impact on the duration of the permitting process. Table 3 provides summary statistics. 
A. Explanatory Variables
The variable MAJOR is a dummy variable equal to one if the construction project is major and zero if minor. The data presented in Table 3 strongly suggest that major projects take much longer to permit than minor projects. Major projects are likely to have a greater impact on the environment, and therefore permit authorization for such projects may take longer.
For the NSR data, POPDEN measures the number of people living within a 3-mile radius of the permit-seeking plant. These data were provided by the EPA's Office of Environmental Compliance and Assurance (OECA). However, this variable was not available for IDPs. As an alternative, for the IDP data set, POPDEN is the population of the county in which the new facility is to be located divided by the land area of that county.
18 I expect permitting authorities to view projects in more densely populated regions to be a greater overall health risk and hence to direct more attention to those permit requests.
The variables ENFLAST3, TRI1, CHTRI, and PART3350 relate specifically to issues concerning voluntary compliance. As a measure of the plant's (firm's) compliance history, ENFLAST3, again available from OECA, indicates the number of enforcement actions taken against the plant (firm) for CAA, CWA, and Resource Conservation and Recovery Act statutory violations over the 3-year period prior to the permit issue date (see Section IIIB for further details regarding this variable). This is the key variable for testing the effect of compliance on permitting. If compliance facilitates permitting, then fewer historical enforcement actions should reduce permitting times.
The variable TRI1, available from the EPA, measures the level (in thousands of tons) of chemicals listed in the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) released by a plant (or group of plants owned by a firm) roughly 1 year prior to a firm's permit application date. 19 The TRI data are often used as a measure of voluntary environmental control.
20 By law, facilities are required to report annually the total amount of certain chemicals (over 600 currently) both released on-site and transferred off-site. The data are self-reported and are not an indicator of a plant's compliance with environmental law. Most of the chemicals reported under the TRI are unregulated, meaning that the actual 18 County population data come from the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Information, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Regional Regional Accounts Data: Local Area Personal Income (http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/regional/reis/). County land area data were obtained from the U.S. Bureau of the Census, County and City Data Book: 1994 (1994) . 19 The TRI program was established as part of the U.S. EPA's Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act. The reason for the 1-year lag is that the TRI data are released with roughly a 1-year lag. 20 level of release is not subject to any federal or state regulatory statute. According to Cothran, we should expect shorter permitting times to be associated with lower TRI releases. In addition to looking at release levels, regulators may respond favorably to TRI reductions (CHTRI).
A final indicator of environmental stewardship is whether the firm participated in the EPA's 33/50 Program. Briefly, this was a purely voluntary toxic pollution control program in which participants were charged with reducing their levels of 17 particularly toxic TRI chemicals by 33 percent by 1992 and 50 percent by 1995, relative to their 1988 levels. 21 The variable PART3350 is a dummy variable that equals one if the plant seeking an NSR permit or IDP is owned by a company that was a 33/50 Program participant and zero otherwise.
The variables RELUNEMP and FIRMREV are other control variables that may influence permitting. The variable RELUNEMP measures the percentage not employed in the county where the permit-seeking plant is located, minus the state unemployment rate during the year when the permit was applied for. Permitting authorities may be under pressure from state legislators, state economic development councils, large companies operating in the state, and even the general voting public to use permitting to facilitate regional economic development. Hence, the estimated effect on permit duration should be negative. The variable FIRMREV measures, in millions of dollars, the total revenues for the firm seeking an NSR permit or IDP for its plant as of the year in which the permit was issued. 22 Regulators may favor high-revenuegenerating companies since these companies tend to build larger operations and employ more of the local labor force.
I also control for interest-group effects on permitting by including the following variables. The variable GREENRAT measures membership rates (per 10,000 state residents) in two prominent environmental groups, the Sierra Club and the Natural Resource Defense Council. 23 Higher environmental, or "green group," membership rates mean that permitting authorities may be pressured to scrutinize permits more closely. The variable TOURINC measures the revenue generated at a state's parks and other state-funded recreation 21 Khanna & Damon, supra note 20, provides a detailed discussion of this program. 22 These data were taken from various issues of Dun and Bradstreet, Million Dollar Directory (published annually).
23 Membership rates were supplied by the Sierra Club and Natural Resource Defense Council. The latest year made available was 1992. State population data come from U.S. Department of Commerce, supra note 18. Since the membership data are at the state level, we cannot determine whether some residents are members of both environmental groups. Regardless, it is unclear whether this double counting represents a problem. If a resident is willing to pay membership dues to two different environmental groups, then it seems reasonable to assume that such individuals place more value on the environment than members of a single group and are likely to support additional pressure on regulatory authorities.
areas by tourist activity per $1,000 of state personal income.
24 States that have a high level of tourism may desire fewer polluting plants. Therefore, more pressure would likely be placed on permitting authorities. The variable CONSERV represents the percentage of state voters that voted Republican in the most recent presidential election preceding a firm's permit request date.
25 A higher percentage is taken to indicate a more "pro-business" political climate. If regulators are responsive to majority opinion, then we should see a quicker turnaround in permitting the higher the percentage of votes for the Republican candidate.
The next variable included in the model is ExQUAL, where for x p AIR the NSR equation and WATER for the IDP equation. These data come from the Council for State Governments and capture state expenditures on air and water quality (see Table 2 ). I expect states with larger budgets for air (water) quality to issue permits more quickly. Finally, I include an interaction variable, MAJOR # GREENRAT, to test whether green groups pressure regulators to scrutinize larger projects more thoroughly than smaller ones.
B. Characteristics of the Permit and Enforcement Data
There are some salient features of the NSR permit and IDP data that are worth discussing before proceeding with the econometric analysis. As stated in Table 1 , NSR construction permits are issued on a project-by-project basis. Since most of the permits listed in the data are for construction modification rather than new facility construction, I will focus only on those NSR permits issued to existing sources for plant construction modification. Therefore, for NSRs, the variable ENFLAST3 measures the number of enforcement actions logged against the plant seeking an NSR permit.
Industrial Discharge Permits are issued on a plant-by-plant basis and are active for 5 years, at the end of which time the plant must reapply to be reissued a new IDP. Since reapplication is largely a matter of procedure, of primary concern to firms is obtaining operating permits for new facilities. Since these IDP observations are for new facilities, plant-level historical chemical release and compliance data are not available. Therefore, for IDPs, ENFLAST3 measures the compliance record of all the other plants located in the same state and owned by the same company.
27 Similarly, the toxic chemical release levels for these permits are the release levels of all the other plants located in the same state and owned by the same company.
As Table 3 illustrates, IDPs take much longer to be approved than NSR permits. There are at least two likely reasons for this. First, IDPs are permits issued to new facilities, whereas the NSR permits examined here are plant modification permits. Having existing information on the plant may help regulators issue NSR permits more quickly. Second, the sheer number of items considered pollutants under the CWA can make IDPs quite complex. Therefore, more time may be needed to ensure that all relevant aspects of the proposed plant's operation are covered.
IV. Econometric Methodology
This paper examines the conditional probability that a plant will be issued either an NSR permit or an IDP in days given that it was not issued in t days. There are essentially two states of the world in this analysis: the t Ϫ 1 initial, or "permit not issued," state and the subsequent "permit issued" state. If I find that, say, fewer historical enforcement actions taken against a plant increase the probability of exiting the permit-not-issued state, I can say that the plant's good historical compliance behavior is effective at speeding up, or facilitating, permit issuance.
The econometric methodology employed here closely follows that of William Greene and Nicholas Kiefer. 28 The function of interest in duration analysis is the hazard function, defined as
where is the cumulative density function and F(t) p Pr (T ! t) f (t) p is the corresponding distribution function. Equation (3) is interpreted dF(t)/dt as a conditional probability. Depending on the characteristics of the density 27 Differences in ENFLAST3 between the two permit types afford an opportunity to see how important other firm and geographic characteristics are to regulators when facility compliance information is not available. As discussed in detail below, my results suggest that plant compliance is of primary interest to regulators when granting authorization to construct. Other firm-level information seems to be of secondary concern. However, at the suggestion of a referee, I did estimate the NSR equation using an ENFLAST3 measure consistent with the IDP equations. As with the original variable definition, this variable was statistically significant, although the effect on permit duration was lower and the precision of the estimated effect was smaller (that is, the resulting p-values were slightly higher). 28 Therefore, a convenient sample estimator for iŝ l(t)
Thus the estimated sample hazard is the number of event completions at duration divided by the number of "survivors" at . Figures 1 and 2 plot t t j j against duration length for both the NSR and IDP data. By inspection, l(t) one can see that in both cases, the estimated sample hazard functions appear to be monotonically increasing, a characteristic of a Weibull distribution (commonly used in duration studies) that exhibits a positive duration de- 29 Greene, supra note 28. It is possible to conduct a semiparametric duration analysis in which no distributional assumption is necessary, but interpreting estimated coefficients can be extremely difficult. 30 Censoring of the dependent variable is pervasive in duration studies simply because, over the sample period of interest, some spells may have not been completed yet. Within my data sets, censoring has not proved to be an issue for two reasons. First, the average length of a permitting spell was roughly 1 to 2 years, and there were very few permit applications for industrial sources in 1999 and 2000. Of these, however, none was a TRI reporting facility. Since TRI is an integral part of the analysis, I was left with a data set of completed spells. 31 For instance, in my NSR data set, but . n p 587 k p 301 
where is the duration of a spell and is a shape parameter.
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t r 1 0 The estimation procedure is conducted as follows. The distribution function for the Weibull distribution is
The explanatory variables enter through . Given its nonnegativity ref (t) l quirement, this can be defined for each observation as i
where, for each permit observation, is a row vector of the ex-
planatory variables and is a column vector of coefficients. We can b z # 1 represent the log-likelihood function for the Weibull distribution as
32 While I use the Weibull distribution in what follows, I also estimated the model using the log logistic distribution (which exhibits both positive and negative duration dependence) and Cox's proportional hazard specification. While quantitative comparisons are difficult, the results using these models are qualitatively similar to those obtained using the Weibull distribution. 33 Note that r is a parameter to be estimated. Since my data suggest positive duration dependence, my estimated r should be greater than one. . Equation (9) is maximized with respect to and
. The resulting sign of the estimated coefficient indicates the effect it has r on the hazard function for each variable. For instance, a positive estimated coefficient indicates that an increase in a particular variable increases the probability of the permit being issued shortly, given that it has not been issued previously, ceteris paribus. Determining the magnitude a particular variable, , has on the hazard x i function involves both and . Given (6) and (8), it can easily be shown b r
The term is thus a semielasticity indicating that a unit change in variable b r l will generate a percent change in the hazard function of .
The expected duration of a spell (of more interest to this study) is simply equal to the inverse of the hazard rate.
34 Thus, the magnitude of a change in a variable on the expected duration, , is a semielasticity indicating
that a unit change in will generate a percentage change in :
p Ϫb r.
( 1 1 (2). While it should be noted that the two procedures are fundamentally different, the majority of those variables that prove significant in the Weibull maximum-likelihood estimation also prove significant using OLS.
V. Estimation Results
Tables 4 and 5 present the estimation results for NSR permits and IDPs, respectively. For each permit type, I estimate two different models. The first model, labeled Weibull (1) and OLS (1), includes those variables listed in equation (2). The second, Weibull (2) and OLS (2), includes the interaction term, ENFLAST3 # MAJOR, to address whether historical noncompliance matters more for major projects seeking authorization. Moreover, since MAJOR appears to have a substantial effect on the length of the permitting process, Tables 6 and 7 Tables 4 and 5 since the likelihood ratio statistics for the full-sample Weibull models (particularly Weibull (2)) suggest that they provide the best overall "explanation" of these duration events.
The first column underneath Weibull (1) and Weibull (2) of each table shows the estimated coefficient for the hazard function, and the second b l column shows the semielasticity, , that measures the impact each varϪb r l iable has on the expected length of permitting times. Note that the value of the shape parameter, , is shown to be greater than one for both NSR permit r and IDP duration equations, conforming to expectations that the data exhibit positive duration dependence.
For NSR permits, whether a construction modification is a major project (MAJOR) has considerable influence on permitting times. It can take two to three times as long to permit a major construction modification project than a minor one. This conforms to expectation. Major projects are likely to have a greater impact on the environment, and therefore such permit applications receive greater scrutiny.
Moreover, the evidence suggests that for major projects, a plant's historical noncompliance proves to have positive and significant effect on the duration of the permitting process. While ENFLAST3 is significant in Weibull (1) Weibull (1) Weibull (2) OLS (1) OLS (2) b and OLS (1), the results for Weibull (2), OLS (2), and those presented in Table 6 strongly imply that noncompliance matters only when considering permits for major projects. According to Weibull (2) in Table 4 , one additional violation increases the time it takes to receive a permit by roughly 23 percent. For the average (median) major NSR permit, this translates into an increase of about 52 days. Several other socioeconomic variables prove significant as well. Referring to Weibull (1) and (2) in Table 4 , construction projects proposed in more densely populated regions of a state (POPDEN) tend to be permitted less Weibull (1) Weibull (2) OLS (1) OLS (2) b quickly than projects proposed in less densely populated regions. 36 The variable RELUNEMP also proves to have a statistically significant negative effect on permit length times. Projects proposed in counties where the unemployment rate is higher than the state's overall unemployment rate tend to get permitted more quickly, irrespective of project size. While the effect is small, this result suggests that environmental regulatory authorities are sensitive to local area economic conditions and may be tempted (or perhaps pressured) to foster economic growth in relatively depressed regions by facilitating permitting. Both GREENRAT and TOURINC have a positive and statistically significant effect on permitting times as well. Thus, both the interests of green groups and those economic sectors dependent on the natural environment do influence permitting decisions. Finally, the results generally support the notion that environmental permits are approved more quickly in more politically conservative states.
Toxic Release Inventory chemical releases (TRI1) and the change in TRI releases (CHTRI) are insignificant. Moreover, whether the plant's parent company was a member of the EPA's 33/50 Program (PART3350) is insig- nificant as well. Hence, there seems to be little evidence in the data that voluntary activities by the plant (or firm) have any impact on environmental regulators when it comes to construction modification permit issuance. Permitting authorities seem more inclined to condition their decisions on a plant's historical compliance record rather than nonstatutory indicators of environmental stewardship. The results for IDPs are similar to those for NSR permits, but there are some differences as well. If the proposed new facility is a major discharger, then receiving an IDP will take about three times longer than it would for a minor discharger. Consistent with the NSR results, for major dischargers, ENFLAST3 is shown to have a (statistically significant) positive effect on the length permitting times. Using results from Weibull (2) in Table 5 , one additional violation at any one of the firm's plants will increase subsequent permitting times by 15 percent. For the average (median) major IDP, this translates into an increase of about 81 days.
Again, consistent with both intuition and the NSR results, RELUNEMP's effect on the permitting times for both major and minor dischargers is negative and significant and the effect is much larger. Moreover, in all four models, CONSERV has a negative and significant effect on permit times. Contrary to expectation and the NSR results, TOURINC and GREENRAT are insignificant, as are CHTRI, EWATERQUAL, and FIRMREV.
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Unlike the NSR equation, TRI1 and PART3350 are significant for IDPs. Greater TRI releases lengthen permitting times, while participation in the 33/50 Program substantially reduces permitting times. These inconsistencies pose an interesting question. Why should a firm's voluntary environmental actions facilitate new plant permitting and not existing plant permitting? The answer seems to be that a plant's historical compliance is the best indicator of its willingness and ability to meet any new permit requirements. In the absence of such information (since new plants have no historical compliance data), regulators may need to broaden their scope and consider other firmlevel environmental information when assessing the likely compliance behavior of a new plant.
Perhaps the most important finding here is that in both the NSR and IDP cases, when it comes to major construction projects, historical enforcement activity is shown to have a crucial impact on regulators. If we think of voluntary compliance as compliance efforts undertaken by firms in order to reap benefits other than penalty avoidance, then the results presented here may offer at least a partial solution to the Harrington paradox discussed in Section I. Firms may be recognizing that good compliance records can reduce the regulatory red tape associated with environmental permitting.
VI. Benefits and Costs of Increased Compliance
If firms comply with environmental regulations to reap benefits other than penalty avoidance, the question remains whether it is worth it to firms to comply in order to avoid permit delays of the magnitudes estimated here. The answer ultimately depends on the firm's marginal costs of compliance relative to the cost savings associated with a shorter permit delay.
While a detailed benefit-cost analysis is beyond the scope of this study, it is possible to obtain an admittedly rough estimate of the cost savings associated with reduced permitting times from increased compliance, relative to compliance costs, by utilizing equation (1). As an illustrative example, I focus on new plant construction-the IDP results. This calculation is performed over a 3-year period since my regression results show that the number of enforcement actions over a 3-year period has a significant effect on permit times. As a measure of compliance costs, I will utilize the U.S. Census Bureau's Pollution Abatement Cost and Expenditure data, last published for the year 1994. 38 In that year, the U.S. census reported that U.S. manufacturers spent $18.772 billion in pollution abatement operating expenditures. According to the U.S. Census Bureau's 1992 Census of Manufactures, the total number of manufacturing establishments was 370,912.
39 Dividing this figure by expenditures provides a rough compliance cost estimate of about $50,476 per plant.
I estimate the number of new plants a firm is likely to build per year in the following manner. Utilizing data from the U.S. Small Business Administration, for 1999 (the latest year of available data), the ratio of new to existing manufacturing establishments was .10. 40 Using the TRI database, I found that in 1995, the average number of plants owned by companies that produce in the six states in my sample was approximately 3.6. By multiplying .10 by 3.6, we obtain a rough measure of the average number of new plants per year a firm will likely build. 41 Recalling that one fewer environmental violation in a 3-year period can reduce IDP issuance by 81 days, by multiplying , we can arrive at an es-.36 # 81 # (cost of regulatory delay) # 3 timate of the cost savings realized from avoiding one environmental violation. Unfortunately, the cost of regulatory delay is not easily estimated.
However, utilizing the above estimates and solving for the cost of regulatory delay, equation (1) implies that if the daily cost of regulatory delay is greater than $577, then it is beneficial for the average firm to incur compliance costs to avoid permit delays. 42 To my knowledge, no systematic study has been undertaken to measure regulatory delay costs. However, as pointed out by Boyd, Krupnick, and Mazurek, permit -S-1, October 1996) . 40 These data are available directly from the Small Business Administration and can be queried at http://www.sba.gov/ADVO/stats. 41 Hence, the average firm that operates plants in the Midwest will build a new plant every 2-3 years. Given the rate of economic growth experienced over the latter part of the 1990s, this number seems reasonable.
42 That is, . 577 p $50,476/(.36 # 81 # 3) 43 Boyd, Krupnick, & Mazurek, supra note 9. 44 Keogh & Evans, supra note 13. building and civil engineering contractors operating in 1995. 45 This implies that the per-contractor cost of delay is roughly between $1,419.85 and $2,129.77. Note, however, that this figure represents only the delay cost of stalled development and does not include the cost of delayed revenue generation from operating a new plant. If this cost were included, total delay costs would be quite high.
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While the above calculation is admittedly rough, these results suggest not only that firms are in a position to directly influence regulatory behavior through their environmental compliance activities but also that their incentives to comply with existing statutes can be substantial. Hence, my findings may offer at least one additional answer to the Harrington paradox. Perhaps part of the reason is to avoid costly regulatory delays in permitting.
VII. Conclusion
In this paper, I have investigated the relationship between environmental compliance, voluntary corporate environmental activities, and the environmental permitting process. I find that, controlling for other variables, better compliance records can shorten the length of time it takes for a firm to receive construction or pollution discharge permits for major projects. This result may partially resolve the counterintuitive result that compliance rates tend to be high even when inspections and penalties are low. Firms may be investing in compliance not simply to avoid regulatory sanctions, but rather to receive positive regulatory benefits such as less bureaucratic red tape during the permitting process. In addition, I find that projects in regions with higher unemployment rates tend to get permitted more quickly and that states that are more politically conservative permit construction projects more quickly.
Finally, as far as voluntary environmental activity is concerned, there does seem to be some evidence that TRI releases and participation in voluntary environmental programs facilitate permitting, but only when plant-level compliance information is not available. Ultimately then, permit authorities seem to be principally concerned with compliance rather than with nonstatutory signals of environmental stewardship. Yet when no compliance data are available, they are indeed likely to consider voluntary environmental behavior when deliberating over environmental permits. This paper offers several opportunities for research extensions. Certainly, a broader geographic focus would be beneficial in verifying the results presented here. Moreover, investigating permitting data other than environmental 45 U.K. Department of Trade and Industry, Construction Statistics Annual, 2001 Edition (2001) . In this publication, the number of "general contractors" is substantially higher. However, most contractors work primarily on residential construction projects. I elected to focus on the building contractors subcategory in an effort to capture those contractors who are mostly engaged in industrial and commercial construction projects.
46 I am indebted to the referee for clarification of this point.
permits, such as building permits issued by municipal governments, might prove illuminating. More important, however, this paper highlights the need for additional research into the cost of regulatory delay. More refined numerical estimates of these costs to both firms and regulatory agencies are necessary to better quantify the relative benefits of increased compliance and reductions in regulatory delay. Obtaining better cost estimates would best be achieved through an extensive survey of manufacturing facilities. However, designing an appropriate survey would require a great deal of time and care. I leave these suggestions for future research.
